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P r e emp t i o n
OCC v. Spitzer: An Erroneous Application of Chevron That Should Be Reversed
BY ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.
Background of OCC v. Spitzer
I n a recent article, Raymond Natter has accuratelydescribed OCC v. Spitzer1 as a ‘‘sweeping decision’’that affirms the power of the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency (‘‘OCC’’) to ‘‘bar State Attorneys
General from investigating or taking legal action
against national banks and their operating subsidiar-
ies.’’2 In OCC v. Spitzer, a federal district court (the
‘‘District Court’’) upheld the validity of 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000, a regulation declaring that the OCC possesses
‘‘exclusive visitorial powers’’ over national banks.3 Visi-
torial powers include the right of a superior authority to
examine a bank and to enforce the bank’s compliance
with applicable laws.4 In upholding § 7.4000, the Dis-
trict Court determined that the OCC possesses exclu-
sive governmental enforcement authority with respect
to all laws—federal and state—that apply to national
banks. Under the District Court’s decision, only the
OCC—not state officials—can file suit to enforce appli-
cable state laws against national banks.
In 12 U.S.C. § 484(a), Congress has provided that
‘‘[n]o national bank shall be subject to any visitorial
powers except as authorized by Federal law, vested in
the courts of justice or such as shall be, or have been
exercised or directed by Congress . . . .’’5 In 2004, the
OCC amended 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 to ‘‘clarify’’ the scope
1 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer, 396
F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (‘‘OCC v. Spitzer’’).
2 Raymond Natter, OCC v. Spitzer: OCC’s Exclusive Au-
thority over National Banks Affirmed, 81 BNA’S BANKING REP.
780, 780 (2005).
3 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a), (b).
4 See First Union National Bank v. Burke, 48 F. Supp. 2d
132, 144-45 (D. Conn. 1999).
5 12 U.S.C. § 484(a). A separate provision of § 484 allows
state officials to examine the records of national banks for the
sole purpose of ensuring compliance with state unclaimed
property or escheat laws. Id. § 484(b).
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of the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of 12
U.S.C. § 484(a).6 The OCC’s purpose in adopting the
2004 amendment was to ensure that
‘‘ . . . the exception for the courts of justice [in 12
U.S.C. § 484(a)] does not permit a State to use the
courts to inspect, examine, regulate or compel action by
a national bank. Instead, the exception simply permits
private litigants to obtain discovery and other typical ju-
dicial relief in actions involving national banks.7
Thus, the 2004 amendment, codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000(b)(2), embodies the OCC’s claim that judicial
proceedings brought by government officials to enforce
state laws against national banks are matters ‘‘within
the OCC’s exclusive purview.’’8
As Mr. Natter has explained, OCC v. Spitzer arose
out of ‘‘attempts by the New York State Attorney Gen-
eral, Eliot Spitzer, to investigate allegations that lending
institutions, including national banks, may have dis-
criminated in the pricing of mortgage loans in violation
of New York law. . . . [T]he Attorney General sent let-
ters to national banks demanding non-public lending
information as part of his ‘preliminary inquiry’ into po-
tential lending discrimination violations.’’9
The OCC conceded that New York’s fair lending
laws, like other state antidiscrimination laws, apply to
residential mortgage loans made by national banks.10
Thus, the OCC did not dispute the applicability of New
York’s fair lending laws to the national banks that re-
ceived Attorney General Spitzer’s requests for informa-
tion.
The OCC also did not contest Attorney General
Spitzer’s authority under New York law to conduct inves-
tigations and initiate judicial proceedings to determine
whether lending institutions had violated New York’s
fair lending laws. However, the OCC maintained that
federal law preempted Attorney General Spitzer’s au-
thority to investigate or bring judicial actions against
national banks.11
District Court’s Deference to OCC’s
‘Interpretation’ of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a)
The District Court granted the OCC’s motion for a
permanent injunction against Attorney General Spitzer.
In doing so, the District Court acknowledged that ‘‘no-
where does the [National Bank] Act precisely define the
scope of the OCC’s exclusive visitorial powers or the
reach of the courts of justice exception’’ in 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a).12 Nevertheless, the District Court held that At-
torney General Spitzer’s investigative and judicial en-
forcement powers were preempted with respect to na-
tional banks by § 484(a) as ‘‘interpreted’’ by the OCC in
12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2).13 Despite the lack of any ex-
plicit statutory mandate for the OCC’s regulation, the
District Court concluded that § 7.4000(b)(2) was en-
titled to ‘‘deference—indeed, controlling weight—under
the familiar framework set forth . . . in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
. . . (1984).’’14
Under ‘‘step one’’ of the Chevron framework, the Dis-
trict Court found that Congress had not addressed the
‘‘precise question at issue’’ that the OCC decided by is-
suing 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2). In the District Court’s
view, the National Bank Act did not ‘‘unambiguously’’
preclude the OCC from adopting a regulation that bars
state officials from initiating judicial enforcement pro-
ceedings against national banks.15
After concluding that Congress had not foreclosed
the OCC’s regulation, the District Court proceeded to a
highly deferential review of the OCC’s rule under ‘‘step
two’’ of Chevron. Applying ‘‘step two,’’ the District
Court concluded that the OCC’s regulation ‘‘reflects a
permissible construction of the statute’’ and should be
given ‘‘controlling weight’’ by the courts.16
Was District Court Correct in Granting Deference
to OCC’s Regulation?
Mr. Natter has justifiably described OCC v. Spitzer as
‘‘a significant victory for the OCC.’’17 However, in my
view the case was wrongly decided and should be re-
versed. As shown below, the District Court’s analysis
was fundamentally flawed, because 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000(b)(2) does not qualify for Chevron deference
and clearly exceeds the OCC’s statutory authority un-
der the National Bank Act. The reasoning of the District
Court—and of three other federal courts that recently
upheld another OCC preemptive rule—suggests that the
OCC can rely on Chevron deference as a sufficient ba-
sis to expand its jurisdiction, and to alter the balance of
federal-state authority, without any clear expression of
supporting congressional intent. The Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Gonzalez v. Oregon,18 which rejected
a similar, open-ended claim for deference by the United
States Attorney General, makes clear that all four deci-
sions are based on an erroneous understanding of
Chevron.
The first section of my analysis presents four reasons
why the District Court should not have granted Chev-
ron deference to 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2).
6 Bank Activities and Operations, 69 F.R. 1895 (2004)
(‘‘2004 OCC Visitorial Powers Rule’’), at 1895, 1900.
7 Natter, supra note 2, at 780 (emphasis added). See also
2004 OCC Visitorial Powers Rule, supra note 6, at 1900.
8 2004 OCC Visitorial Powers Rule, supra note 6, at 1900
(emphasis added).
9 Natter, supra note 2, at 780-81. As Mr. Natter also ob-
served, ‘‘[t]he Attorney General’s concerns were based on pre-
liminary and raw data released [by lending institutions] under
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, that showed that members
of certain minority groups were charged, on average, higher
mortgage rates than whites.’’ Id. at 780.
10 OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 385; see also National
State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985-87 (3d Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that New Jersey’s anti-redlining statute applied to mort-
gage loans made by national banks); cf. Kroske v. US Bank
Corp., 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Washington’s
statute prohibiting age discrimination in employment applied
to national banks).
11 See OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 387-88.
12 Id. at 393.
13 Id. at 385, 407. For purposes of the District Court’s opin-
ion, the term ‘‘national banks’’ includes operating subsidiaries
of national banks, based on a recent Second Circuit decision
that upheld another OCC preemptive rule, codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4006. Under § 7.4006, the OCC has declared that state laws
apply to operating subsidiaries only to the extent that such
laws apply to national banks. OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d
at 385 n.1 (citing Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305
(2d Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, No. 05-431 (U.S. Sept. 30,
2005)).
14 OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 390 (quote), 404-07.
15 Id. at 393-94.
16 Id. at 399, 406.
17 Natter, supra note 2, at 782.
18 No. 04-623 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
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First, the OCC’s regulation embodied a preemption
determination, and preemption determinations by fed-
eral agencies raise sensitive issues of federalism that re-
quire de novo review by the courts.
Second, the OCC’s regulation infringes upon the
states’ sovereign authority to enforce their laws and
thereby raises serious issues under the Tenth Amend-
ment. The District Court should have refused to defer to
§ 7.4000(b)(2) under Chevron, because (i) the OCC’s
rule was not supported by any clear statement of con-
gressional intent to divest the states of their sovereign
law enforcement authority, and (ii) the OCC’s claim for
Chevron deference must give way to the judicial canon
in favor of avoiding significant constitutional questions.
Third, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Gonzalez v.
Oregon shows that the District Court overlooked a cru-
cial precondition for judicial deference under ‘‘step
two’’ of Chevron. That precondition—which I call
‘‘Chevron step 2.1’’—requires a reviewing court to de-
termine whether a federal agency’s regulation has been
‘‘promulgated pursuant to authority Congress has del-
egated to the [agency].’’19 Under Gonzalez, it is not
proper for a court to grant deference ‘‘merely because
the statute is ambiguous.’’20 Rather, the court must
carefully examine the text and structure of the govern-
ing statute to determine whether it reveals a congres-
sional intent to delegate the full extent of the rulemak-
ing power claimed by the agency.
Gonzalez indicates that a searching analysis of con-
gressional intent is particularly called for when the
agency asserts a ‘‘broad and unusual authority’’ based
on an ‘‘implicit delegation.’’21. In addition, the court
must keep in mind that Congress is unlikely to use
‘‘muffled hints’’ either to ‘‘alter a statute’s obvious
scope’’ or ‘‘to regulate areas traditionally supervised by
the States’ police power.’’22 When 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000(b)(2) is scrutinized under the standards articu-
lated in Gonzalez, it becomes clear that the regulation
far exceeds the scope of the OCC’s authority under the
National Bank Act.
Fourth, the OCC was motivated by a powerful finan-
cial interest when it adopted § 7.4000(b)(2) in 2004, as
one of a series of preemption rules. The OCC’s preemp-
tion rules were designed to persuade large, multistate
banks to operate under national charters, thereby in-
creasing the OCC’s assessment revenues and budgetary
resources. In view of the OCC’s obvious self-interest in
adopting § 7.4000(b)(2), the District Court should not
have given any deference to that regulation.
The remaining sections of my analysis demonstrate
that 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2) is contrary to the text and
history of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) and related statutes, as
well as authoritative judicial constructions of the Na-
tional Bank Act. The explicit language of 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a) preserves, without any limitation, visitorial pow-
ers that are ‘‘vested in the courts of justice.’’ The ordi-
nary meaning of the statutory text indicates a congres-
sional intent to preserve the states’ ability to enforce
their laws through judicial proceedings. Nothing in the
clause’s unqualified terms, or in related statutes, sug-
gests that Congress intended to restrict the availability
of judicial process to private litigants, as the OCC has
claimed.
Moreover, the OCC’s regulation is contrary to a long
series of judicial decisions. Since 1870, the Supreme
Court and other federal and state courts have repeat-
edly upheld the authority of state officials to obtain ju-
dicial remedies to enforce state laws against national
banks. In 1982, Congress reenacted the ‘‘vested in the
courts of justice’’ clause without change in 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a), thereby indicating its presumptive agreement
with those court decisions.
In addition, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (‘‘Riegle-Neal Act’’)
expressed Congress’ strong desire to maintain the bal-
ance between state and federal law which then existed
within the dual banking system. Thus, the position as-
serted by the OCC in § 7.4000(b)(2) is unsupported by
any congressional mandate and is contradicted by the
great weight of judicial authorities. Given the limited
scope of the OCC’s rulemaking power under 12 U.S.C.
§ 93a, the OCC had no authority to rewrite § 484(a) in
the guise of interpretation.
Analysis
1. The District Court Erred in Granting
Deference to 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2)
Under Chevron
a. Section 7.4000(b)(2) Is a Preemptive Rule and
Therefore Does Not Qualify for Judicial Deference Un-
der Chevron. Section 7.4000(b)(2) is a preemptive regu-
lation that purports to bar state officials from suing in
either federal or state courts to enforce valid state laws
against national banks. In adopting § 7.4000(b)(2), the
OCC relied primarily on 12 U.S.C. § 484(a), which pro-
vides that ‘‘[n]o national bank shall be subject to any
visitorial power except as authorized by Federal law,
vested in the courts of justice or such as shall be, or have
been exercised by Congress . . . .’’23 On its face, the
‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause exempts all visi-
torial powers exercised by federal and state courts from
the prohibition contained in 12 U.S.C. § 484(a). A
common-sense reading of § 484(a) would permit all ju-
dicial proceedings that are lawfully instituted against
national banks, including those initiated by state offi-
cials to enforce applicable state laws.
Thus, the OCC’s regulation should be rejected for the
same reason that the Supreme Court struck down the
United States Attorney General’s interpretive rule in
Gonzalez v. Oregon—namely, that the regulation con-
flicts with the ‘‘ordinary meaning’’ and ‘‘common-
sense’’ application of the governing statute.24
As the District Court acknowledged in OCC v.
Spitzer, ‘‘nowhere does the [National Bank] Act define
the scope of the OCC’s exclusive visitorial powers or
the reach of the courts of justice exception.’’25 Hence,
the text of the National Bank Act does not place any
limitation on the visitorial powers that are ‘‘vested in
the courts of justice’’ under 12 U.S.C. § 484(a). Never-
theless, by adopting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2), the OCC
19 Id., slip op. at 11.
20 Id.
21 Id., slip op. at 2, 20, 28.
22 Id., slip op. at 28.
23 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (emphasis added).
24 No. 04-623 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006), slip op. at 27-28.
25 OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 393.
3
BANKING REPORT ISSN 0891-0634 BNA 2-20-06
asserted that § 484(a) must be construed to preempt all
judicial enforcement proceedings brought by state offi-
cials, despite the absence of any specific language to
that effect in the statute itself.
The OCC’s preemption determination is not entitled
to deference, because the issue of whether a federal
statute preempts state law is a legal question as to
which courts have superior expertise, as well as an in-
stitutional responsibility to resolve sensitive issues in-
volving the allocation of power under our federal sys-
tem. Indeed, ‘‘the whole jurisprudence of pre-emption’’
is one of the important ways in which the judiciary ‘‘has
participated in maintaining the federal balance’’ be-
tween national and state authority.26
The Supreme Court has never ruled definitively on
the question of whether the Chevron doctrine applies to
preemption determinations by federal agencies. In
Chevron itself, the Supreme Court was not faced with
any preemption issue and considered only the question
of whether the federal agency’s interpretation was con-
sistent with the governing federal statute.27
In Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,28 the Su-
preme Court confirmed that Chevron establishes an
‘‘ordinary rule of deference’’ to agency interpretations
of the meaning of a federal statute.29 However, on the
issue of whether Chevron applies to a federal agency’s
preemption determination, the Court assumed, without
deciding, that the question of a statute’s preemptive ef-
fect ‘‘must always be decided de novo by the courts.’’30
The Tenth Circuit had previously decided the issue left
unresolved in Smiley. The Tenth Circuit declared in
1991 that agency preemption determinations are not en-
titled to deference under Chevron, because such a de-
termination ‘‘involves matters of law—an area more
within the expertise of the courts than within the exper-
tise of the [agency].’’31
Recent Decisions Misapplied Chevron in
Upholding OCC’s Preemption Rules
In three recent decisions, the Second, Sixth and
Ninth Circuits granted deference under Chevron to an-
other OCC regulation—12 C.F.R. § 7.4006, which pre-
empts the states’ authority to regulate operating subsid-
iaries of national banks. However, all three decisions
failed to acknowledge Smiley or to consider whether
preemption determinations are so different in kind from
other agency interpretations that they do not qualify for
deference under Chevron.32 The Supreme Court re-
cently indicated its interest in this issue when it invited
the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views
of the United States in response to Connecticut’s peti-
tion for certiorari in Wachovia v. Burke, requesting re-
view of the Second Circuit’s decision.33
The Second, Sixth and Ninth Circuits also erred
when they refused to apply a presumption against pre-
emption in determining whether the OCC had authority
to adopt its rule preempting state regulation of national
bank operating subsidiaries. A presumption against
preemption would have precluded Chevron deference
in all three cases, because such a presumption would
have required the OCC to show that 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006
was consistent with ‘‘the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.’’34
In Wachovia v. Burke, the Second Circuit concluded
that a presumption against preemption was inappli-
cable, because ‘‘[r]egulation of federally chartered
banks’’ is an area that has been ‘‘substantially occupied
by federal authority for an extended period of time.’’35
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits adopted the same view.36
Not surprisingly, the District Court in OCC v. Spitzer
followed Burke in rejecting any presumption against
preemption.37
The Second, Sixth and Ninth Circuits were clearly
mistaken in adopting such a narrowly restricted view of
the states’ role in regulating national banks. In its 1997
decision in Atherton v. FDIC,38 the Supreme Court af-
firmed that ‘‘federally chartered banks are subject to
state law.’’39 As support for that principle, the Court
cited decisions reaching back to an 1870 case, which
held that national banks
‘‘. . . are subject to the laws of the State, and are gov-
erned in their daily course of business far more by the
laws of the State than of the nation. All their contracts
are governed and construed by State laws. Their acqui-
sition and transfer of property, their right to collect
their debts, and their liability to be sued for debts, are
all based on State law. It is only when State law inca-
pacitates the [national] banks from discharging their
duties to the federal government that it becomes uncon-
stitutional.’’40
26 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995)
(Kennedy and O’Connor, JJ., concurring).
27 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. Similarly, in a decision that
granted Chevron deference to an OCC interpretive ruling, the
Supreme Court considered only the question of whether the
OCC’s ruling was consistent with federal statutes limiting the
powers of national banks. Nationsbank of N.C. v. Variable An-
nuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995) (‘‘VALIC’’). Thus, nei-
ther Chevron nor VALIC raised any preemption issues.
28 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
29 Id. at 740.
30 Id. at 743-44.
31 Colorado Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Harmon, 951 F.2d 1571,
1579 (10th Cir. 1991).
32 Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 315, 318-21
(2d Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, No. 05-431 (U.S., Sept.
30, 2005); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th
Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949,
958-62 (9th Cir. 2005).
33 See 74 U.S.L.W. 3334 (2005) (quoting the Supreme
Court’s order in Burke v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 05-431
(U.S., Dec. 5, 2005)).
34 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). For evi-
dence that 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 was not supported by any ‘‘clear
and manifest purpose of Congress,’’ see infra note 90 and ac-
companying text; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemp-
tion Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Seri-
ous Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protec-
tion, 23 ANN. REV. OF BANKING & FINANCIAL L. 225, 324-48 (2004).
35 Wachovia v. Burke, 414 F.3d at 314 (quoting Flagg v.
Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 343 (2005)).
36 Wachovia v. Watters, 431 F.3d at 560 n.3 (quoting Flagg
and citing Bank of Am. v. City and County of San Francisco,
309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 2002)); Boutris, 419 F.3d at 956 (cit-
ing Bank of Am.).
37 OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
38 519 U.S. 213 (1997).
39 Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
40 Id. at 222-23 (quoting National Bank v. Commonwealth
of Kentucky, 76 U.S (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1870)).
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In its 1996 decision in Barnett Bank of Marion
County, N.A. v. Nelson,41 the Supreme Court held that
states have ‘‘the power to regulate national banks,
where . . . doing so does not prevent or significantly in-
terfere with the national bank’s exercise of its pow-
ers.’’42 In 1999, when Congress enacted the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (‘‘GLBA’’),43 Congress adopted the
‘‘prevent or significantly interfere with’’ test as the gov-
erning standard for evaluating preemption claims based
on Barnett Bank with respect to insurance sales, solici-
tation or crossmarketing activities by national banks,
other depository institutions or their affiliates.44
In both Atherton45 and Barnett Bank,46 the Supreme
Court cited its earlier decision in Anderson National
Bank v. Luckett.47 In Luckett the Court declared that
‘‘national banks are subject to state laws unless those
laws infringe the national banking laws or impose an
undue burden on the performance of the banks’ func-
tions.’’48 In two previous cases, the Court affirmed that
‘‘the operation of general state laws upon the dealings
and contracts of national banks’’ is the ‘‘rule’’, while
preemption is an ‘‘exception’’ that applies only when
state laws ‘‘expressly conflict with the laws of the
United States or frustrate the purpose for which na-
tional banks were created, or impair their efficiency to
discharge the duties imposed upon them by the law of
the United States.’’49
Presumption Against Preemption Should Be
Applied With Regard to State Laws Regulating
National Banks
All of the foregoing decisions of the Supreme Court
are consistent with the presumption against preemption
that the Court has applied in fields of traditional state
regulation.50 The Court has made clear that this pre-
sumption against preemption also applies when ‘‘the
field [of traditional state concern] is said to have been
pre-empted by an agency, acting pursuant to congres-
sional delegation.’’51 In such a case, the federal agency
must show ‘‘a conflict between a particular [state-law]
provision and the federal scheme, that is strong enough
to overcome the presumption that state and local regu-
lation . . . can constitutionally coexist with federal regu-
lation.’’52
Congress expressed its support for the presumptive
application of state laws to national banks when it
passed the Riegle-Neal Act.53 The Riegle-Neal Act re-
quires interstate branches of national banks to comply
with host state laws in four broadly-defined areas—
community reinvestment, consumer protection, fair
lending and intrastate branching—unless federal law
preempts the application of state law to national banks.
12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(A). In explaining why state laws
should generally apply to national banks, the confer-
ence report on the Riegle-Neal Act declared:
‘‘States have a strong interest in the activities and op-
erations of depository institutions doing business
within their jurisdictions, regardless of the type of char-
ter an institution holds. In particular, States have a legiti-
mate interest in protecting the rights of their consum-
ers, businesses and communities . . . .
‘‘Under well-established judicial principles, national
banks are subject to State law in many significant re-
spects . . . . Courts generally use a rule of construction
that avoids finding a conflict between the Federal and
State law where possible. The [Riegle-Neal Act] does not
change these judicially established principles.’’54
By referring to ‘‘judicially established principles’’ un-
der which ‘‘national banks are subject to State law in
many significant respects,’’ the Riegle-Neal conferees
clearly indicated their agreement with the Supreme
Court decisions discussed above. Indeed, Congress has
long followed a policy favoring the general application
of state laws to national banks, in order to maintain a
competitive equilibrium within the dual banking system
of national and state banks.55
The clear error underlying the refusal of the Second
and Ninth Circuits to apply a presumption against pre-
emption is shown by their misplaced reliance on United
States v. Locke.56 In Locke, the Supreme Court de-
clined to apply a presumption against preemption in
striking down state laws that imposed restrictions on oil
tankers operating in navigable waterways. The Court
emphasized that the challenged state laws sought to
regulate ‘‘national and international maritime com-
merce,’’ an area in which Congress had shown a strong
desire to establish a ‘‘uniformity of regulation.’’57 By
contrast, in Atherton, after reviewing the long history of
state regulation of national banks, the Supreme Court
held that federal policy did not require any ‘‘uniformity’’
of regulatory treatment for federally-chartered banks.58
Thus, the rejection of a presumption against preemp-
tion by the Second, Sixth and Ninth Circuits finds no
support in Locke and is plainly inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Atherton, Luckett, St.
Louis, and McClellan, as well as the Riegle-Neal confer-
ence report. In a recent decision, Kroske v. US Bank
41 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
42 Id. at 33.
43 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338.
44 See 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A); H.R. Rep. No. 106-434, at
156-57 (1999) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N.
245, 251.
45 519 U.S. at 223
46 517 U.S. at 33.
47 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
48 Id. at 248.
49 First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640,
656 (1924); McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 357 (1896).
50 E.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475, 484-85
(1996); Blue Cross, 514 U.S. at 654-56 (1995).
51 Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laborato-
ries, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1985).
52 Id. at 716.
53 Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338.
54 H.R. Rep. No. 103-651, at 53 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (empha-
sis added), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2068, 2074.
55 See Wilmarth, supra note 34, at 257 (stating that ‘‘Con-
gress has followed a ‘policy of equalization’ designed to main-
tain a basic parity of competitive opportunities between na-
tional and state banks’’) (quoting First National Bank of Logan
v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261 (1966), and
Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 292 U.S. 559, 564-66 (1934));
see also id. at 266 (explaining that Congress has carried out
‘‘its general policy of maintaining a competitive balance in the
dual banking system’’ in two ways—first, by ‘‘expressly incor-
porating state-law standards’’ into federal statutes, and sec-
ond, ‘‘through statutory silence’’ that allows state laws to ap-
ply to national banks except in situations where a state law
creates an ‘‘irreconcilable conflict with federal law’’).
56 529 U.S. 89 (2000). See Wachovia v. Burke, 414 F.3d at
314 (citing Locke); Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558 (same).
57 Locke, 529 U.S. at 108.
58 Atherton, 519 U.S. at 219-26.
5
BANKING REPORT ISSN 0891-0634 BNA 2-20-06
Corp.,59 the Ninth Circuit appears to have retreated
somewhat from its position inWells Fargo v. Boutris. In
Kroske the Ninth Circuit applied a presumption against
preemption in determining that a national bank must
comply with a Washington statute prohibiting age dis-
crimination in employment. The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the Washington statute was consistent with
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (‘‘ADEA’’),
a federal statute which creates a ‘‘cooperative state-
federal anti-discrimination scheme’’ allowing for
supplemental state regulation and enforcement.60
The national bank in Kroske argued that the Wash-
ington statute was preempted by 12 U.S.C. § 24(Fifth),
which allows national bank directors to dismiss bank
officers ‘‘at pleasure.’’ However, the Ninth Circuit
held—in view of the ADEA’s status as a more recent
federal statute—that § 24(Fifth) does not prevent na-
tional bank officers from asserting state-law claims that
are consistent with the ADEA.61
Existence of Preemptive Agency Rule Should Not
Remove Presumption Against Preemption
Kroske was different from Boutris in one important
respect. The OCC has not issued any regulation inter-
preting the meaning or scope of the ‘‘dismiss . . . at
pleasure’’ language in 12 U.S.C. § 24(Fifth). Therefore,
the national bank in Kroske—unlike the national bank
in Boutris—could not argue that the Ninth Circuit
should give Chevron deference to an OCC rule assert-
ing that the National Bank Act preempts state law. As a
consequence, the national bank in Kroske bore the bur-
den of proof in establishing that federal law preempted
the Washington age discrimination statute, while the
state official in Boutris effectively bore the burden of
proof in showing that the OCC’s regulation was unau-
thorized.
It is unreasonable—and inconsistent with traditional
concepts of federalism—for a court to shift the burden
of proof in a preemption case simply because a federal
agency has issued a regulation that allegedly preempts
state law. As noted above, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Hillsborough County supports the view that the same
presumption against preemption should apply whether
the source for the alleged preemption is a statute or an
agency rule.62
In Kroske the Ninth Circuit applied a presumption
against preemption based on its explicit recognition of
both ‘‘the State’s historic police powers to prohibit dis-
crimination on specified grounds’’ and ‘‘the historic
dual regulation of [national] banks by state and federal
law.’’63 As discussed above, those factors are also
present in OCC v. Spitzer.64 Moreover, Kroske agrees
with decisions of several other lower federal courts and
state courts, which have applied a presumption against
preemption in affirming the applicability of state laws to
national banks.65
The District Court therefore erred in OCC v. Spitzer
when it rejected a presumption against preemption.
Proper application of the presumption would have pre-
cluded Chevron deference and would have required a
decision striking down 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2), be-
cause Congress has never expressed a ‘‘clear and mani-
fest purpose’’ to bar the states from bringing judicial
enforcement proceedings against national banks.66 As
discussed below, the text and history of 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a) and related statutes demonstrate Congress’
clear understanding that the states do have authority to
seek judicial remedies to enforce applicable state laws
against national banks.
b. Section 7.4000(b)(2) Infringes upon the States’
Sovereign Authority to Enforce Their Laws. Section
7.4000(b)(2) unlawfully interferes with the sovereign
authority of each state to enforce its laws. The Supreme
Court has made clear that the ability of each state to en-
force its laws is a crucial aspect of its sovereignty. In
Heath v. Alabama,67 the Court declared that ‘‘[a]
State’s interest in vindicating its sovereign authority
through enforcement of its laws by definition can never be
satisfied by another State’s enforcement of its own
laws.’’68
Similarly, in Butkus v. Illinois,69 the Court held that a
federal prosecution could not deprive a state of its sov-
ereign authority to enforce its criminal code, because
such a result ‘‘would be in derogation of our federal sys-
tem’’ and would constitute ‘‘a shocking and untoward
deprivation of the historic right and obligation of the
States to maintain peace and order within their con-
fines.’’70
In United States v. Wheeler,71 the Supreme Court de-
clared that ‘‘[e]ach [state] has the power, inherent in any
sovereign, independently to determine what shall be an
offense against its authority and to punish such of-
fenses.’’72 Similarly, in Heath and United States v.
Lanza,73 the Court explained that the states’ authority
to make and enforce laws derives from powers ‘‘origi-
nally belonging to [the states] before admission to the
Union and preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment.’’74
In subsequent decisions, which limited the authority
of federal courts to review state court convictions in
criminal cases, the Supreme Court emphasized the
close connection between a state’s lawmaking and law
59 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005).
60 Id. at 985 (quote), 987-88.
61 Id. at 985-89 (concluding that the ‘‘dismiss . . . at plea-
sure’’ provision of 12 U.S.C. § 24(Fifth) was repealed by impli-
cation to the extent that it conflicted with the later-enacted
ADEA).
62 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Hillsborough County).
63 Id. at 981-82.
64 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting the
OCC’s concession that New York’s fair lending laws apply to
mortgage loans made by national banks).
65 E.g., National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d
Cir. 1980); Video Trax, Inc. v. NationsBank, 33 F. Supp. 2d
1041, 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 822 (2000); Perdue v. Crocker
National Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 519-23 (Cal. 1985), appeal
dism’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Peatros v. Bank of Am., NT &
SA, 990 P.2d 539, 542-43 (Cal. 2000); North Dakota v. Liberty
National Bank & Trust Co., 427 N.W.2d 307, 309-10, 314-15
(N.D. 1988).
66 Blue Cross, 514 U.S. at 655 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at
230).
67 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
68 Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
69 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
70 Id. at 137.
71 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
72 Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
73 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
74 Heath, 474 U.S. at 89 (emphasis added); accord, Lanza,
260 U.S. at 382.
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enforcement powers. The Court declared: ‘‘Our federal
system recognizes the independent power of a State to
articulate societal norms through criminal law; but the
power of a State to pass laws means little if the State can-
not enforce them.’’75
As the Supreme Court explained in Wheeler, federal
preemption of a state’s authority to enforce its criminal
code ‘‘would trench upon important state interests’’ and
would ignore the ‘‘settled ‘dual sovereignty’ concept’’
that applies in the field of law enforcement.76 Likewise,
in St. Louis the Court emphatically rejected the claim—
asserted both by a national bank and by the United
States as amici curiae—that federal officials possessed
exclusive authority to institute judicial proceedings
against a national bank for a violation of state law.77
The Court declared:
‘‘The state statute as applied to national banks is-
. . . valid, and the corollary that it is obligatory and en-
forceable necessarily results, unless some controlling
reason forbids; and since the sanction behind it is that of
the State and not that of the National Government, the
power of enforcement must rest with the former and not
with the latter. To demonstrate the binding quality of a
statute but deny the power of enforcement involves a
fallacy made apparent by the mere statement of the
proposition, for such a power is essentially inherent in the
very conception of law.’’78
In First Union National Bank v. Burke,79 the district
court held that the OCC had exclusive authority ‘‘to di-
rectly enforce state banking law against national banks
through administrative orders.’’80 However, the court
confirmed that ‘‘a state may seek enforcement of its
state banking laws in either federal or state court’’ under
the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a).81 The court rejected the Connecticut Banking
Commissioner’s argument that the Tenth Amendment
precluded the OCC from exercising exclusive adminis-
trative enforcement authority with regard to state laws.
At the same time, the court emphasized that § 484(a)
‘‘expressly leaves available judicial remedies [allowing
state officials] to compel national bank compliance with
state law.’’82 The court’s opinion clearly suggests that
the court would have perceived a serious Tenth Amend-
ment issue if the OCC had sought to bar state officials
from seeking ‘‘judicial remedies’’ to enforce applicable
state laws against national banks.83
District Court Ignored States’ Sovereign Law
Enforcement Authority
In OCC v. Spitzer the District Court should not have
deferred to § 7.4000(b)(2) under Chevron, because that
regulation infringes upon the states’ sovereign law en-
forcement powers, preserved by the Tenth Amendment.
Section 7.4000(b)(2) seeks to preempt all authority of
the states to enforce their laws against national banks
through judicial proceedings.
The OCC has removed any doubt as to the sweep of
its regulation by proclaiming that any decision on
whether to enforce an applicable state law against a na-
tional bank is a matter that falls ‘‘within the OCC’s ex-
clusive purview.’’84 The OCC’s exercise of discretion in
deciding whether to enforce a particular state law
against a national bank would be ‘‘presumed immune
from judicial review’’ under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), because enforcement de-
cisions are ‘‘generally committed to an agency’s abso-
lute discretion.’’85 If 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2) is upheld,
it would be extremely difficult for state officials to ob-
tain judicial review of refusals by the OCC to enforce
applicable state laws against national banks. Conse-
quently, § 7.4000(b)(2) severely impairs the states’ sov-
ereign authority to prevent violations of their laws by
national banks.
In an analogous case, the Supreme Court refused to
defer to a federal agency’s rule, because the rule ap-
plied the governing federal statute in an aggressive
manner that created ‘‘significant constitutional and fed-
eralism questions.’’86 The Court concluded that the
agency’s position ‘‘alter[ed] the federal-state frame-
work by permitting federal encroachment upon a tradi-
tional state power,’’ and the agency could not show ‘‘a
clear indication that Congress intended that result.’’87
In the absence of any clear statement of congres-
sional intent, the District Court should not have allowed
the OCC to issue a regulation infringing upon the states’
traditional law enforcement powers. Given the serious
Tenth Amendment issues raised by the regulation, ‘‘the
constitutional avoidance canon of statutory interpreta-
tion trumps Chevron deference.’’88
c. The District Court Improperly Applied ‘‘Step
Two’’ of Chevron. In OCC v. Spitzer, the District Court
apparently viewed the absence of a federal statute pro-
hibiting the OCC’s regulation as a sufficient basis for its
decision (i) to reject New York’s challenge to the regu-
lation’s validity under ‘‘step one’’ of Chevron, and (ii) to
proceed to a highly deferential review of the regulation
under ‘‘step two’’ of Chevron.89
In practical effect, the District Court’s application of
Chevron would give the OCC an unlimited authority to
75 Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 557, 566 (1998) (quoting
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991)).
76 Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 332.
77 See St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 643 (argument by counsel for
national bank); id. at 645-48 (argument for the Solicitor Gen-
eral on behalf of the United States as amici curaie).
78 Id. at 659-60 (emphasis added).
79 48 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Conn. 1999),
80 Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
81 Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
82 Id. at 148-49 (emphasis added).
83 See id. at 150-51 (explaining that ‘‘[t]his order in no way
precludes . . . the [Connecticut Banking] Commissioner from
seeking enforcement of this state banking statute against the
plaintiff national bank though the courts’’) (emphasis added).
84 2004 OCC Visitorial Powers Rule, supra note 6, at 1900
(emphasis added).
85 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985); see also
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 164-66 (2d Cir.
2004).
86 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
87 Id. at 172-73.
88 University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1340-41
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (refusing to defer to an agency regulation that
raised serious constitutional questions under the First Amend-
ment). See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562
(1995) (declaring that ‘‘this Court will construe a statute in a
manner that requires decision of serious constitutional ques-
tions only if the statutory language leaves no reasonable alter-
native’’).
89 See id. OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d—at 393-94 (find-
ing no reason to conclude that ‘‘the statute unambiguously
contravenes the OCC’s interpretation as reflected in 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000’’).
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issue rules preempting state law except in areas where
Congress affirmatively barred such regulations by unam-
biguous statutory language. The Second, Sixth and
Ninth Circuits applied similar reasoning in upholding
12 C.F.R. § 7.4006. All three courts granted deference
under ‘‘step two’’ of Chevron after concluding that Con-
gress did not express a ‘‘manifest’’ or ‘‘unambiguous’’
intent to prohibit the OCC from adopting its rule pre-
empting the states’ authority to regulate operating sub-
sidiaries of national banks.90
The foregoing decisions are clearly erroneous in view
of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gonzalez v.
Oregon.91 In Gonzalez, the Court declared that ‘‘Chev-
ron deference . . . is not accorded merely because the
statute is ambiguous and an administrative [agency] is
involved.’’92 Rather, deference is appropriate under
‘‘step two’’ of Chevron only if a federal agency’s regula-
tion is ‘‘promulgated pursuant to authority Congress
has delegated to the [agency].’’93
Moreover, Gonzalez indicates that a reviewing court
should be skeptical when an agency claims ‘‘broad and
unusual authority through an implicit delegation’’ that
is allegedly derived from ‘‘vague terms or ancillary pro-
visions’’ in the governing statute.94 In such a case, the
reviewing court may properly conclude that ‘‘Congress
could not have intended to delegate a decision of such
economic and political significance to an agency in so
cryptic a fashion.’’95
The Need for a ‘Chevron Step 2.1’ Test
Gonzalez makes clear that statutory silence or ambi-
guity is not a sufficient basis for granting deference un-
der ‘‘step two’’ of Chevron. Before a reviewing court
may defer to an agency regulation under ‘‘step two,’’
the court must first perform an analysis that I call
‘‘Chevron step 2.1.’’ Under this ‘‘step 2.1,’’ the court
must carefully consider whether Congress has autho-
rized the agency to adopt a regulation to clarify the am-
biguity or to fill the ‘‘gap’’ that the agency has identified
in the governing statute.
Only if the court answers ‘‘yes’’ at ‘‘step 2.1’’ may the
court then proceed to a more deferential analysis of
whether the agency has made a ‘‘reasonable’’ interpre-
tation of the statute.96 In addition, if the agency adopts
an ‘‘interpretation’’ of a statute that significantly ex-
pands the agency’s jurisdiction or encroaches upon an
area traditionally regulated by the states, the reviewing
court should require a clear showing that the agency’s
‘‘interpretation’’ is consistent with the available evi-
dence of Congress’ intent.97
In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court struck down an in-
terpretive rule issued by the United States Attorney
General. In that rule, the Attorney General declared
that physicians prescribing controlled substances for
assisted suicides were not engaged in legitimate medi-
cal practice, regardless of state law to the contrary, and
were subject to civil and criminal sanctions under fed-
eral law. The Supreme Court observed that the federal
Controlled Substances Act (‘‘CSA’’) prohibits doctors
from using drug prescriptions ‘‘as a means to engage in
illicit drug dealing and trafficking as conventionally un-
derstood.’’98 However, the Court determined that the
CSA ‘‘manifests no intent to regulate the practice of
medicine generally’’ and, instead, indicates a congres-
sional purpose to ‘‘rely upon a functioning medical pro-
fession regulated under the States’ police powers.’’99
The Court therefore invalidated the Attorney General’s
rule, because (i) the Attorney General’s claim of author-
ity would ‘‘effect a radical shift of authority from the
States to the Federal Government to define general
standards of medical practice in every locality,’’ and (ii)
the ‘‘text and structure of the CSA show that Congress
did not have this far-reaching intent to alter the federal-
state balance and the congressional role in maintaining
it.’’100
The District of Columbia Circuit followed a similar
line of reasoning in a recent decision that refused to
give Chevron deference to a ruling of the Federal Trade
Commission (‘‘FTC’’).101 The FTC’s ruling sought to
classify attorneys as ‘‘financial institutions’’ for pur-
poses of Title V of GLBA—a classification that would re-
quire attorneys to comply with Title V’s customer pri-
vacy provisions.102 The D.C. Circuit found that the
FTC’s ‘‘attempted turf expansion’’ would enable the
FTC to ‘‘extend its regulatory authority over attorneys
engaged in the practice of law,’’ even though ‘‘the regu-
lation of the practice of law is traditionally the province
of the states.’’103 In concluding that the FTC’s ruling did
not qualify for Chevron deference, the court empha-
sized:
‘‘Federal law may not be interpreted to reach into ar-
eas of State sovereignty unless the language of the federal
law compels the intrusion . . . . Otherwise put, if Congress
intends to alter the usual constitutional balance be-
tween the States and the Federal Government, it must
make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the lan-
guage of the statute.’’104
The court concluded that the FTC had no authority to
issue its ruling, because ‘‘Congress has not made an in-
90 See Wachovia v. Burke, 414 F.3d at 317-18 (finding ‘‘no
manifest congressional intent to preclude the OCC regulations
in this case’’ because ‘‘no [federal] statute speaks directly to
the scope of federal versus state power over [operating subsid-
iaries]’’); Wachovia v. Watters, 431 F.3d at 561-62 (concluding
that ‘‘Congress has not spoken precisely on the issue’’ because
the ‘‘absence of any [statutory] reference’’ to the allocation of
federal and state authority over operating subsidiaries ‘‘does
not convey the unambiguous intent of Congress’’);Wells Fargo
v. Boutris, 419 F.3d at 961 (stating that the National Bank Act
‘‘is silent as to the OCC’s authority to regulate operating sub-
sidiaries’’).
91 No. 04-623 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
92 Id., slip op. at 11.
93 Id.
94 Id., slip op. at 20.
95 Id., slip op. at 21 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
96 See id.; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 229 (2001) (explaining that deference under ‘‘step two’’ of
Chevron is appropriate if it is ‘‘apparent from the agency’s
generally conferred authority and other statutory circum-
stances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to
speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the
statute or fills a space in the enacted law’’).
97 See Gonzalez v. Oregon, No. 04-623 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006),
slip op. at 20-21, 24-25, 28.
98 Id., slip op. at 23.
99 Id.
100 Id., slip op. at 28.
101 Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(‘‘ABA v. FTC’’).
102 See id. at 465-66.
103 Id. at 467, 468, 471-72.
104 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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tention to regulate the practice of law ‘unmistakably
clear’ in the language of the GLBA.’’105
Like the Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Oregon, the
D.C. Circuit repudiated the notion that Chevron allows
a federal agency to issue rules in any area over which it
has arguable jurisdiction, so long as Congress has not
enacted a statute that expressly forbids the agency’s ac-
tion. The D.C. Circuit specifically rejected the FTC’s
suggestion that a federal agency is entitled to highly
deferential review under ‘‘Chevron step two . . . any
time a [federal] statute does not expressly negate the
existence of a claimed administrative power.’’106 The
D.C. Circuit declared that such an application of Chev-
ron would be ‘‘ ‘flatly unfaithful to the principles of admin-
istrative law . . . and refuted by precedent.’ . . . Plainly, if
we were ‘to presume a delegation of power from the ab-
sence of an express withholding of such power, agencies
would enjoy virtually limitless hegemony . . . .’ ’’107
In view of Gonzalez v. Oregon and ABA v. FTC, the
District Court clearly erred in OCC v. Spitzer when it
deferred to 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2) under ‘‘step two’’ of
Chevron. The District Court improperly proceeded to
‘‘step two’’ based on its finding that the National Bank
Act did not ‘‘unambiguously’’ foreclose the OCC’s regu-
lation.108 As shown above, however, the OCC’s regula-
tion entrenches upon the states’ sovereign law enforce-
ment powers. Moreover, the OCC cannot point to any
‘‘unmistakably clear’’ expression of a congressional in-
tent to prohibit the states from enforcing their laws by
means of judicial proceedings against national
banks.109
The unqualified exemption provided by § 484(a) for
visitorial powers ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ indi-
cates that Congress did not intend to bar state officials
from bringing judicial enforcement proceedings.110 As
demonstrated below, the plain meaning of the ‘‘vested
in the courts of justice’’ clause is supported by related
statutes and judicial opinions. In light of all these fac-
tors, the OCC’s extraordinary claim of authority to issue
a regulation overriding a sovereign state power does not
qualify for deference under Chevron and should be re-
jected.
d. Section 7.4000(b)(2) Is Not Entitled to Defer-
ence in View of the OCC’s Strong Self-Interest in
Adopting the Rule There is an additional reason to
deny Chevron deference to 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2). In
recent years, the OCC has proclaimed that preemption
of state law ‘‘is a significant benefit of the national
charter—a benefit that the OCC has fought hard over
the years to preserve.’’ In the OCC’s view, a ‘‘major ad-
vantage of the national charter’’ is created by the OCC’s
efforts to provide a regime that will enable national
banks ‘‘to conduct a multistate business subject to a
single uniform set of federal laws, under the supervi-
sion of a single regulator, free from visitorial powers of
various state authorities.’’111
In a newspaper interview published in 2002, Comp-
troller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. acknowl-
edged that the OCC’s preemption of state consumer
laws and state visitorial authority ‘‘provides an incen-
tive for banks to sign up with the OCC . . . . ‘It is one of
the advantages of a national charter, and I’m not the
least bit ashamed to promote it.’ ’’112
Many of the largest national banks publicly sup-
ported the OCC’s decision in January 2004 to adopt
§ 7.4000(b)(2) and to promulgate additional preemption
rules. Commentators generally viewed those rules as
serving the interests of big banks with extensive inter-
state operations.113 In response to the OCC’s aggressive
preemption campaign, several large, multistate banks
converted from state to national charters.114 As a result
of those conversions, the portion of the nation’s com-
mercial banking assets held by state-chartered banks
fell from about 40 percent in 2003 to just over 30 per-
cent in 2005.115 In September 2005, FDIC Chairman
Donald E. Powell described the impact of the OCC’s
‘‘sweeping’’ preemption rules in the following terms:
‘‘[T[he dual banking system is at a crossroads. The
share of banking activity conducted through state-
chartered banks is dwindling and there is every reason
to believe that trend will continue. The issue goes well
beyond market share, to fundamental issues about com-
petitive fairness and states’ ability to enforce laws pro-
tecting consumers. . . .
‘‘The facts of life today with regard to preemption are
fairly simple. A state-chartered bank that wants to do
business across state lines is at a substantial disadvan-
tage relative to a national bank . . . .’’116
OCC’s Financial Motivation for Adopting Its
Preemption Rules
The OCC has a powerful motivation to persuade large
banks to operate under national charters. Virtually all
of the OCC’s budget is funded by assessments paid by
national banks, and the biggest national banks pay the
highest assessments.117 The OCC recorded a 15 percent
105 Id.
106 ABA v. FTC, 457 F.3d at 468 (quoting Ry. Labor Exec.
Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(emphasis in original)).
107 Id. (emphasis added in part) (quoting Ry. Labor Exec.
Ass’n, 29 F.3d at 671).
108 OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94.
109 See ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d at 471-72 (declaring that ‘‘Fed-
eral law may not be interpreted to reach into areas of State
sovereignty’’ without an ‘‘unmistakably clear’’ statement of
congressional intent).
110 As noted above, the District Court acknowledged in
OCC v. Spitzer that ‘‘nowhere does the [National Bank] Act
precisely define the scope of the OCC’s exclusive visitorial
powers or the reach of the courts of justice exception.’’ 396
F. Supp. 2d at 393.
111 Speech by Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke,
Jr. on Feb. 12, 2002 (emphasis added) (quoted in Wilmarth, su-
pra note 34, at 236, 274).
112 Jess Bravin & Paul Beckett, Friendly Watchdog: Federal
Regulator Often Helps Banks Fighting Consumers,WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 28, 2002, at A1 (quoting Mr. Hawke in part).
113 See Wilmarth, supra note 34, at 276 & n.201, and au-
thorities cited therein.
114 Id. at 274-79, 289-93; Laura T. Osuri, ‘‘Trustmark of
Miss. Sticking with OCC,’’ American Banker, Sept. 20, 2004, at
5, 2004 WLNR 4060209 (reporting that J.P. Morgan Chase,
HSBC and Harris Bank had converted from state to national
charters in 2004).
115 Remarks by FDIC Chairman Donald E. Powell Before
the American Bankers Ass’n Annual Convention, Sept. 26,
2005, at 3 (available at www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/
chairman/spsept2605).
116 Id. at 1-2.
117 Under 12 C.F.R. § 8.2(a), the highest assessment rates
are paid by national banks with assets over $40 billion. See
also OCC Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2005, at 7 (reporting that
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increase in assessment revenues during its 2005 fiscal
year, and the OCC attributed a significant portion of
that increase to ‘‘new large banks joining the national
banking system.’’118
Thus, the OCC has a compelling financial incentive to
adopt preemptive regulations in order to attract large,
multistate banks and thereby enhance its financial re-
sources. The OCC’s self-interest seems to be reflected in
its ‘‘relatively lax’’ and ‘‘unimpressive’’ record of en-
forcing consumer protection laws against national
banks, compared to the much more vigorous enforce-
ment efforts of state authorities.119 In view of the OCC’s
financial and empire-building motivations for promul-
gating its preemption rules—including 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000(b)(2)—those rules should not be given any def-
erence by the courts.120
2. Section 7.4000(b)(2) Conflicts with
Congressional Intent, as Shown by the
Text and History of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a)
and Related Statutes
The OCC’s attempt to bar state officials from seeking
judicial enforcement of state law is contrary to the text
and history of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) and related statutes.
Section 484(a) was originally enacted as § 54 of the Na-
tional Bank Act of 1864 (‘‘NBA’’). Section 54 authorized
the OCC to examine national banks and also provided
that national banks ‘‘shall not be subject to any other
visitorial powers than such as are authorized by this
act, except such as are vested in the several courts of law
and chancery.’’ Thus, the earliest version of § 484(a) pro-
vided the courts with explicit and unqualified authority
to exercise visitorial powers over national banks.
Section 53 of the NBA, presently codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 93(a), authorized the OCC to bring suit in federal
court to obtain a forfeiture of ‘‘all the rights, privileges,
and franchises of the [national banking] association’’ if
the directors of the bank knowingly violated the NBA or
permitted the bank’s officers, agents, or employees to
do so.122 In OCC v. Spitzer, the District Court con-
cluded that § 53 supported the OCC’s claim of exclusive
authority to institute all types of judicial enforcement
proceedings against national banks.123 However, § 53
dealt only with court proceedings to obtain one type of
judicial remedy—viz., forfeiture of a national bank’s
charter for violations of federal law. Section 53 did not
refer to causes of action for other types of judicial rem-
edies against national banks, nor did § 53 contain any
explicit prohibition against court suits by state officials
to enforce state laws.
Section 57 of the NBA provided that ‘‘suits, actions,
and proceedings’’ against a national bank could be
brought in federal court or in ‘‘any state, county, or mu-
nicipal court in the county or city in which such
[national bank] is located, having jurisdiction in similar
cases.’’124 The only exception from § 57’s general grant
of concurrent jurisdiction to state courts was that fed-
eral courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over ‘‘all
proceedings to enjoin the [OCC].’’125 In a 1917 decision,
the Supreme Court found that § 57 provided a strong in-
dication of Congress’ intent to allow state officials to ob-
tain judicial remedies from state courts for the purpose
of enforcing state laws against national banks.126 That
decision has never been overruled.
The provisions of §§ 53, 54 and 57 of the NBA were
carried forward into §§ 5198, 5239, 5240, and 5241 of
the Revised Statutes. Section 5198 (as amended in
1875) incorporated the jurisdictional provisions of § 57
of the NBA.127 Section 5239 incorporated the provisions
of § 53 of the NBA, authorizing the OCC to file suit in
federal court to revoke a national bank’s charter for vio-
lations of the NBA. Sections 5240 and 5241 incorpo-
rated, respectively, the OCC’s examination powers and
the limitation on visitorial powers ‘‘other than such
as . . . are vested in the courts of justice’’, as originally
provided in § 54 of the NBA. Ultimately, the same pro-
visions were codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 93(a), 94 (until its
partial repeal in 1982), 481 and 484(a).
Congress passed additional statutes in 1882, 1887
and 1888 to regulate the jurisdiction of federal and state
courts over national banks. Those statutes were ulti-
mately codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1348. Section 1348 gives
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over actions by fed-
eral officials to wind up the affairs of a national bank or
actions by a national bank to enjoin the OCC or any re-
ceiver acting under the OCC’’s direction.
However, § 1348 also provides that national banks
‘‘shall, for the purpose of all other actions by or against
them, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are
respectively located.’’128 Thus, under § 1348, national
banks are subject to suit in state courts unless they can
establish either diversity jurisdiction or federal question
jurisdiction.129
In 1982, Congress repealed a portion of 12 U.S.C.
§ 94.130 The repealed portion—derived from § 57 of the
original NBA and Rev. Stat. § 5198—provided that a na-
tional bank could be sued in state or local courts only in
the county or city in which the national bank was ‘‘lo-
97 percent of the OCC’s operations are funded by ‘‘seminan-
nual assessments levied on national banks’’); id. at 62 (stating
that ‘‘the percentage of total OCC assets attributable to large
banks increased from 82.4 percent to 85.6 percent’’ during its
2005 fiscal year).
118 OCC Annual Report, Fiscal Year, 2005, at 62 & tbl. 9 (re-
porting that the OCC’s assessment revenues rose from $482.3
million in fiscal year 2004 to $557.8 million in fiscal year 2005).
119 Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory
Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda 78 TEMPLE L.
REV. 1, 70-74, 77-81 (2005) (quote at 81); Wilmarth, supra note
34, at 232 (quote), 306-16, 348-56.
120 Wilmarth, supra note 34, at 232, 276-78, 293-98; see also
Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-
Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 208-11, 262-73,
282-87 (2004); Peterson, supra note 119, at 70-74, 77-84.
Act of June 3, 1864, c. 106, § 54, 13 Stat. 116 (emphasis
added).
122 Id. § 53, 13 Stat. 116.
123 OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
124 Act of June 3, 1864, c. 106, § 57, 13 Stat. 116-17.
125 Id., 13 Stat. 117.
126 First National Bank of Bay City v. Fellows, 244 U.S. 416,
428 (1917).
127 See Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S.
520, 527-28 (1963) (app.); First National Bank of Charlotte v.
Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 144-45 (1889).
128 12 U.S.C. § 1348 (emphasis added). In Wachovia Bank,
N.A. v. Schmidt, No. 04-1186 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006), the Supreme
Court held that a national bank is ‘‘located,’’ for purposes of
§ 1348, only in the state where it maintains its main office.
129 See Langdeau, 371 U.S. at 526-27, 528-29 (app.); Conti-
nental National Bank v. Buford, 191 U.S. 119, 123-24 (1903).
130 Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 406, 96 Stat. 1512.
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cated.’’131 The purpose of the 1982 repeal was to make
clear that, except for cases dealing with national bank
receiverships, ‘‘judicial venue [in cases involving na-
tional banks] will lie in the appropriate federal, state or
local court, as determined by other general venue stat-
utes.’’132
Thus, Congress has consistently manifested its intent
to make national banks subject to suit in state courts to
the same extent as other citizens of the states in which
such banks are ‘‘located,’’ except for (i) suits by the
OCC to revoke a national bank’s charter or to wind up
the affairs of a national bank, or (ii) suits to enjoin the
OCC or a receiver acting under the OCC’s direction.
Congress never expressed a specific intent to bar
state officials from bringing judicial proceedings to en-
force state laws against national banks in §§ 53, 54 and
57 of the original NBA, or in §§ 5198, 5239, 5240 and
5241 of the Revised Statutes, or in 12 U.S.C. §§ 93(a),
94, 484(a) and 1348. In the absence of any express
statement of congressional intent, it must be presumed
that Congress did not intend to divest the states of their
sovereign authority to enforce their laws by bringing ju-
dicial proceedings against national banks. Such a pre-
sumption is consistent with (1) the Supreme Court’s
recognition that each state has ‘‘the power, inherent in
any sovereign, independently to determine what shall
be an offense against its authority and to punish such
offenses,’’133 and (2) the Court’s admonition that
‘‘[u]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will
not be deemed to have significantly changed the
federal-state balance.’’134
District Court’s Misplaced Reliance on 12 U.S.C.
§ 36(f)(1)(B)
In OCC v. Spitzer, the District Court found support
for the OCC’s regulation in 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(B), a
statute enacted in 1994 as part of the Riegle-Neal Act.
Under § 36(f)(1)(B), host state laws that apply to inter-
state branches of national banks ‘‘shall be enforced’’ by
the OCC.135 However, for two reasons, § 36(f)(1)(B)
does not support either the OCC’s rule or the District
Court’s decision. First, the legislative history of
§ 36(f)(1(B) indicates that Congress intended to give the
OCC exclusive authority to make examinations of inter-
state branches of national banks and to bring ‘‘supervi-
sory’’ (i.e., administrative) enforcement actions against
such branches. That legislative history does not include
any explicit reference to judicial proceedings.136
Second, the House-Senate conferees on the Riegle-
Neal Act expressed their great concern with maintain-
ing ‘‘the balance of Federal and State law under the
dual banking system.’’137 The conferees emphasized
that ‘‘Congress does not intend that the [Riegle-Neal
Act] alter this balance and thereby weaken States’ au-
thority to protect the interests of their consumers, busi-
nesses, or communities.’’138 In First Union v. Burke, the
district court concluded, after reviewing the text and
legislative history of the Riegle-Neal Act, that ‘‘the regu-
latory structure of Section 36(f)(1)(B) reflects Congres-
sional intent that the existing regulatory scheme remain
unchanged.’’139 Thus, there is no evidence indicating
that § 36(f)(1)(B) was intended to change ‘‘the balance
of Federal and State law’’ by weakening the states’ en-
forcement authority as it existed in 1994 under the
‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a).
Moreover, the Riegle-Neal Act did not repeal or
amend the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of
§ 484(a). Given the strong presumption against implied
repeals of federal statutes, § 36(f)(1)(B) cannot reason-
ably be construed as having repealed by implication the
authority of state officials to initiate judicial enforce-
ment proceedings under the ‘‘vested in the courts of jus-
tice’’ clause of § 484(a).140
Congress also did not express any intent in the
Riegle-Neal Act to overturn the numerous court
decisions—discussed in the next section—which have
upheld the states’ authority to institute judicial enforce-
ment proceedings against national banks. Indeed, the
House-Senate conferees expressed their general agree-
ment with existing court decisions governing the appli-
cation of state laws to national banks. The conferees
noted with approval that ‘‘[c]ourts generally use a rule
131 See Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Bougas, 434
U.S. 35, 35-36, 41-42 (1977).
132 S. Rep. No. 97-536, at 28 (1982) (emphasis added), re-
printed in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3054, 3081.
133 Heath, 474 U.S. at 89 (quotingWheeler, 435 U.S. at 320).
134 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173 (quoting United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
135 OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 402-03 (quoting 12
U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(B)).
136 See 130 Cong. Rec. S12786 (daily ed., Sept. 13, 1994)
(colloquy between Senators D’Amato and Riegle). See also
First Union v. Burke, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 146 (stating that the
text and legislative history of § 36(f)(1)(B) are ‘‘consistent’’
with the view that the OCC possesses ‘‘exclusive administrative
enforcement authority’’ over national banks) (emphasis
added).
137 H.R. Rep. No. 103-651, at 53 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (em-
phasis added), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2068, 2074.
138 Id. A separate provision of the Riegle-Neal Act, codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 43, further manifests the intent of Congress to
preserve the federal-state balance in the dual banking system
that existed in 1994. Section 43 requires a federal banking
agency to follow notice-and-comment procedures whenever it
intends to issue a preemption ruling with regard to state laws
in the areas of community reinvestment, consumer protection,
fair lending, and establishment of intrastate branches. The
House-Senate conferees emphasized that the notice-and-
comment process mandated by § 43 was intended to help
maintain the balance between federal and state authority over
national banks that existed in 1994:
This process is not intended to confer upon the [federal]
agency any new authority to preempt or to determine preemp-
tive Congressional intent in the four areas described, or to
change the substantive theories of preemption as set forth in
existing law. Rather, it is intended to help focus any adminis-
trative preemption analysis and to help ensure that any agency
only makes a preemption determination when the legal basis
is compelling and the Federal policy interest is clear.
H.R. Rep. No. 103-651, supra, at 55 (emphasis added), re-
printed in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2076.
139 First Union v. Burke, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 146 (emphasis
added).
140 See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (holding
that ‘‘repeals by implication are not favored . . . The intention
of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest’’) (inter-
nal quotation marks and citations omitted); Morton v. Man-
cari, 434 U.S. 535, 549-51 ((1974) (refusing to conclude that a
1934 statute was repealed by implication in a 1972 statute, be-
cause (i) the argument for implied repeal relied only on ‘‘con-
gressional silence’’, (ii) ‘‘[t]here is nothing in the legislative
history . . . that indicates affirmatively any congressional intent
to repeal the 1934 [statute],’’ and (iii) there was no showing
that ‘‘the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable’’).
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of construction that avoids finding a conflict between
the Federal and State law where possible. The [Riegle-
Neal Act] does not change these judicially established prin-
ciples.’’141
3. The Courts Have Repeatedly Upheld
the States’ Authority to Enforce Their
Laws by Bringing Judicial Proceedings
Against National Banks
Section 7.4000(b)(2) is contrary to a series of cases
decided since 1870, in which the courts have allowed
state officials to obtain judicial remedies to prevent or
punish violations of state laws by national banks. In Na-
tional Bank v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,142 Ken-
tucky filed suit in state court to force a national bank to
comply with a state law requiring each bank to pay, on
behalf of its shareholders, the state tax due on their
shares. The Supreme Court upheld a state court judg-
ment that ordered the national bank to pay the state tax
owed by its shareholders. In doing so, the Supreme
Court declared:
‘‘[W]hile Congress intended to limit State taxation to
the shares of the bank, as distinguished from its capital,
. . . it did not intend to prescribe to the States the mode
in which the tax should be collected. . . . It is not to be
readily inferred, therefore, that Congress intended to
prohibit this mode of collecting a tax which they ex-
pressly permitted the States to levy.’’143
Thus the Court did not question the authority of Ken-
tucky officials to institute a state court proceeding to en-
force the state’s tax law against the national bank.
Similarly, in Waite v. Dowley,144 the Supreme Court
affirmed a state court judgment imposing a civil money
penalty on a national bank’s cashier. The cashier had
refused to comply with a Vermont law requiring him to
provide a list of the national bank’s shareholders (and
the amounts paid for their stock) to the treasurer of the
town in which the bank was located. The Court held
that ‘‘[s]ome legislation of Vermont was . . . necessary
to the proper exercise of the rightful [taxing] powers of
the State, and, so far as it required this list, was not in
conflict with any provision of the act of Congress.’’145
Again, the Court did not question the authority of the
town treasurer to enforce Vermont’s law by filing suit in
a state court.
In Guthrie v. Harkness,146 a shareholder of national
bank filed suit in a Utah state court to enforce his
common-law right to inspect the bank’s books and
records. The Utah court ordered the bank to permit in-
spection, finding that the shareholder’s demand was
made, in part, ‘‘for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the business affairs of the said bank have been con-
ducted according to law.’’147
In affirming the state court’s decision, the Supreme
Court noted that a national bank is ‘‘subject by statute
to be sued in the courts of the State.’’148 The Court also
observed that ‘‘visitorial powers’’ include actions taken
by ‘‘a superior or superintending officer who visits a
corporation to examine into its manner of conducting
business, and enforce an observance of its laws and
regulations.’’149 Thus, the Supreme Court made clear in
Guthrie that the term ‘‘visitorial powers’’ in § 484(a) re-
fers primarily to examinations and enforcement pro-
ceedings involving national banks.
For two alternative reasons, the Court in Guthrie re-
jected the national bank’s claim that a shareholder in-
spection would violate the limitation on ‘‘visitorial pow-
ers’’ under Rev. Stat. § 5241, the precursor of 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a). First, the Court held that the term ‘‘visitorial
powers’’ did not include the ‘‘private right of the share-
holder’’ to exercise his inspection rights.150 Second, as-
suming arguendo that shareholder inspection rights
should be treated as a visitorial power, the Court ex-
plained that § 5241 provided ‘‘the full measure of visito-
rial power’’ over a national bank ‘‘[e]xcept in so far as
such corporation was liable to control in the courts of jus-
tice.’’151 The Court therefore concluded that § 5241 ‘‘did
not intend . . . to take away the right to proceed in courts
of justice to enforce such recognized rights as are here
involved.’’152
District Court’s Decision Not Supported by
Guthrie, Refuted by Bay City, St. Louis
In Guthrie the Supreme Court applied § 5241 in ac-
cordance with its plain terms. The Court confirmed that
national banks were ‘‘liable to control in the courts of
justice,’’ and the Court upheld the authority of federal
and state courts to enforce ‘‘recognized rights’’ against
national banks. Guthrie affirmed these principles in a
case where the plaintiff was seeking to determine
whether a national bank’s business was being ‘‘con-
ducted according to law.’’ The plaintiff was a private
shareholder, not a state official.
Consequently, the District Court in OCC v. Spitzer
was clearly mistaken in inferring that the discussion of
§ 5241 in Guthrie was intended to question sub silentio
the authority of state officials to bring judicial enforce-
ment proceedings against national banks.153 Any such
inference is plainly contradicted by the Supreme
Court’s previous decisions in National Bank of Com-
monwealth and Waite v. Dowley, which affirmed state
court judgments obtained by state officials to enforce
valid state laws against national banks. The Supreme
Court in Guthrie did not question the correctness of ei-
ther decision, nor did the Court consider the authority
of state officials to initiate judicial enforcement pro-
ceedings.
Any doubts regarding the proper interpretation of the
‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of § 5241 were
removed by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions
in Bay City and St. Louis. In Bay City, the Court af-
firmed the authority of Michigan’s state attorney gen-
eral to bring a quo warranto action in the Supreme
141 H.R. Rep. No. 103-651, at 53 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (em-
phasis added), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2074.
142 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353 (1870).
143 Id. at 363.
144 94 U.S. 527 (1877).
145 Id. at 534.
146 199 U.S. 148 (1905).
147 Id. at 150 (quoting Utah trial court’s decision) (emphasis
added); see also id. at 155 (opinion of the Court).
148 Id. at 157.
149 Id. at 158 (emphasis added) (quoting First National
Bank of Youngstown v. Hughes, 6 Fed. 737, 740 (C.C. N.D.
Ohio 1881, appeal dism’d, 106 U.S. 523 (1883)).
150 Id. at 158.
151 Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
152 Id. (emphasis added).
153 See OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 400-01, 405-06.
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Court of Michigan against a national bank whose trust
business allegedly violated Michigan law.
The Court noted that the national bank’s trust activi-
ties involved ‘‘a business of a private nature’’ and, ac-
cordingly, ‘‘state regulations for the conduct of such
business, if not discriminatory or so unreasonable as to
justify the conclusion that they would necessarily so op-
erate, would be controlling upon banks chartered by
Congress.’’154 The Court therefore held that state offi-
cials could sue national banks in state courts to stop
trust activities that violated valid state laws, particularly
since the governing federal statute prohibited national
banks from conducting a trust business ‘‘in contraven-
tion of state or local law.’’155 The Court found further
support for its conclusion in § 57 of the original NBA,
which made ‘‘controversies concerning national banks
cognizable in state courts because of their intimate re-
lation to many state laws and regulations.’’156
In St. Louis the Supreme Court upheld the authority
of Missouri’s attorney general to bring a quo warranto
proceeding in the Supreme Court of Missouri to compel
a national bank to close a branch that violated Missou-
ri’s antibranching law. The national bank and the
United States as amici curiae argued that federal law
completely preempted the authority of state officials to
bring judicial enforcement actions against national
banks.
Bank counsel and the Solicitor General contended
that the OCC had exclusive authority to bring judicial
proceedings against the national bank for violations of
law, in view of (1) Rev. Stat. § 5239, which allowed the
OCC to sue for forfeiture of a national bank’s charter
for violations of the NBA, and (2) Rev. Stat. 5241, which
limited the exercise of visitorial powers over national
banks. Bank counsel, the Solicitor General and three
dissenting members of the Court also maintained that
only the United States, as the chartering authority for
national banks, could bring a quo warranto proceeding
against a national bank.157
However, as discussed above, the Supreme Court in
St. Louis strongly affirmed the state attorney general’s
authority to enforce Missouri’s antibranching law by
means of a judicial proceeding. The Court stressed that
Missouri’s attorney general was seeking to enforce a
state statute, not any provision of the NBA, and the
Court upheld Missouri’s quo warranto proceeding as an
appropriate state remedy to enforce a valid state law
against the national bank:
‘‘The State is neither seeking to enforce a law of the
United States nor endeavoring to call the bank to ac-
count for an act in excess of its charter powers. What
the State is seeking to do is to vindicate and enforce its
own law, and the ultimate inquiry which it propounds is
whether the bank is violating that law . . . . Having de-
termined that the power sought to be exercised finds no
justification in any law or authority of the United States,
the way is open for enforcement of the state statute.
‘‘The application of the state statute to the present case
and the power of the State to enforce it being established,
the nature of the remedy to be employed is a question for
state determination; and the judgment of the state court
that the one employed here was appropriate is conclu-
sive, unless it involves a denial of due process of law,
which plainly it does not.’’158
Subsequent Decisions Affirmed States’ Authority
to Enforce State Laws Against National Banks
Since St. Louis, numerous federal and state courts
have confirmed the authority of state officials to sue in
federal and state courts to enforce valid state laws
against national banks. In several cases, courts have up-
held the authority of state officials to enforce state laws
against national banks by means of suits for injunctive
relief, notwithstanding challenges raised by the OCC
and/or the defendant banks.159 In a number of other
cases, the courts have not questioned the power of state
officials to bring judicial actions for compulsory en-
forcement remedies against national banks.160
In National State Bank v. Long,161 the Third Circuit
held that 12 U.S.C. § 484 preempted the authority of
state officials to bring administrative actions for cease-
and-desist orders or civil money penalties against na-
tional banks. However, the Third Circuit did not con-
sider or question the authority of state officials to en-
force state laws against national banks through judicial
proceedings.
Subsequently, in First Union National Bank v.
Burke,162 the district court drew a sharp distinction be-
tween administrative and judicial enforcement proceed-
ings. The district court agreed with the Third Circuit
that the OCC has exclusive authority to bring administra-
154 First National Bank in Bay City v. Fellows, 244 U.S. 416,
426 (1917).
155 Id. at 426-27 (referring to the precursor of 12 U.S.C.
§ 93a).
156 Id. at 428.
157 See First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263
U.S. 640, 642-43 (1924) (argument by counsel for national
bank); id. at 645-48 (argument by counsel for the United
States); id. at 666-68 (Van Devanter, J., joined by Taft, C.J., and
Butler, J., dissenting). Justice Van Devanter and Justice Day
had previously dissented on similar grounds from the Court’s
decision in Bay City. See Bay City, 244 U.S. at 429-32 (Van
Devanter and Day, JJ., dissenting).
158 Id. at 660-61. The Supreme Court had previously upheld
a state quo warranto proceeding against due process and equal
protection challenges in Standard Oil Co v. Missouri, 224 U.S.
270 (1912).
159 E.g., Jackson v. First National Bank of Valdosta, 349
F.2d 71, 74-75 (5th Cir. 1965) (upholding a state banking com-
missioner’s authority to bring suit for injunctive relief); Nuesse
v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 699-705 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (granting, de-
spite the OCC’s opposition, the motion of a state banking com-
missioner to intervene in a suit seeking injunctive relief); Mis-
souri ex rel. Kostman v. First National Bank in St. Louis, 405
F.2d 733, 735 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (confirming a state banking
commissioner’s standing to file suit for injunctive relief), aff’d,
538 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941
(1976); Colorado ex rel. State Banking Board, 540 F.2d 497,
498-99 (10th Cir. 1976) (rejecting the OCC’s challenge to the
standing of Colorado’s state banking board), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1091 (1977); Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard, 102
N.W.2d 777, 792-97 (Mich. 1960) (upholding a state attorney
general’s authority to bring a quo warranto action);Minnesota
by Lord v. First National Bank of St. Paul, 313 N.W.2d 390, 395
(Minn. 1981) (affirming a state treasurer’s enforcement au-
thority), appeal dism’d, 456 U.S. 967 (1982).
160 E.g., Brown v. Clarke, 878 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1989); Mut-
schler v. Peoples National Bank of Washington, 607 F.2d 274
(9th Cir. 1979); New York by Abrams v. Citibank, N.A., 537
F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. N.Y. 1982); North Dakota v. Liberty Na-
tional Bank & Trust Co., 427 N.W.2d 307 (N.D. 1988).
161 630 F.2d 981, 988-89 (3d Cir. 1980).
162 48 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Conn. 1999).
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tive enforcement actions against national banks.163
However, the district court also held—citing Bay City
and other cases cited above—that ‘‘a state may seek en-
forcement of its banking laws in either federal or state
court’’ pursuant to the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’
clause of § 484(a).164
In OCC v. Spitzer, the District Court held that the
OCC could disregard St. Louis as a controlling judicial
construction of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) because ‘‘the actual
opinion of St. Louis did not mention or cite section 5241
of the Revised Statutes.’’165 That conclusion is clearly
erroneous. As noted above, the Supreme Court declared
in St. Louis that it would be a ‘‘fallacy’’ to acknowledge
‘‘the binding quality of a [state] statute but deny the
power of enforcement’’ to an authorized state offi-
cial.166 Moreover, it would have been logically impos-
sible for the Supreme Court to uphold the Missouri at-
torney general’s authority to bring a quo warranto pro-
ceeding without rejecting the arguments made by the
national bank’s counsel and the Solicitor General, who
vigorously asserted that the OCC had exclusive author-
ity to bring judicial enforcement proceedings against
national banks under Rev. Stat. §§ 5239 and 5241.167
For two reasons, the District Court also erred in find-
ing that Chevron permitted the OCC to adopt an inter-
pretation of § 484(a) that was contrary to St. Louis.168
First, as demonstrated above, the OCC’s interpretation
does not qualify for deference under Chevron. Second,
even if Chevron applies, the Supreme Court has held
that a federal agency is bound by a prior judicial inter-
pretation of a statute ‘‘if the prior court holding ‘deter-
mined a statute’s clear meaning.’ ’’169 As demonstrated
above, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bay City and
St. Louis—as well as subsequent decisions of lower fed-
eral courts and state courts—clearly establish that the
‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of § 484(a) does
permit state officials to initiate judicial proceedings to
enforce state laws against national banks. Moreover,
those judicial decisions—unlike 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2)
—are consistent with the plain, common-sense meaning
of the language used by Congress. In such circum-
stances, Chevron does not allow the OCC to disregard
these authoritative judicial constructions.
In OCC v. Spitzer, the District Court was also mis-
taken in describing as ‘‘dicta’’ the careful distinction
drawn in First Union v. Burke between administrative
and judicial enforcement of state laws against national
banks.170 In First Union v. Burke, as previously shown,
the court’s discussion of the states’ authority to enforce
state laws by means of judicial proceedings was not
dicta, but was instead a crucial premise on which the
court based its decision to dismiss Connecticut’s Tenth
Amendment claim.171
The District Court in OCC v. Spitzer further argued
that the distinction drawn in Burke between administra-
tive and judicial enforcement proceedings was ‘‘re-
jected’’ in two subsequent district court decisions.172
However, the District Court ignored the important fact
that, as discussed above, the opinion in Burke (i) con-
tained an extensive and persuasive analysis of the text
and history of § 484(a) and (ii) was consistent with prior
judicial decisions. In contrast the two decisions cited in
OCC v. Spitzer did not include any comparable analysis
and cannot be reconciled with Bay City, St. Louis and
other court decisions reviewed above.173
Congress Implicitly Endorsed Decisions Allowing
States to Seek Enforcement Against National
Banks
Finally, the District Court overlooked the significance
of Congress’ reenactment of the ‘‘vested in the courts of
justice’’ clause in 1982, without any change. In 1982,
Congress amended 12 U.S.C. § 484 by adding a new
provision, codified as § 484(b). Section 484(b) autho-
rizes state officials to examine the records of a national
bank ‘‘solely to ensure compliance with applicable State
unclaimed property or escheat laws upon reasonable
cause to believe that the bank has failed to comply with
such laws.’’174 Section 484(b) does not address the au-
thority of state officials to bring judicial enforcement
proceedings; it deals only with their right to examine na-
tional bank records for the specified purpose.175 In the
same 1982 statute, Congress reenacted the original
§ 484—including the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’
clause—without making any changes. The original
§ 484 was recodified as § 484(a).176
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that ‘‘Con-
gress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or
judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that in-
terpretation when it re-enacts a statute without
163 See id. at 143-50.
164 Id. at 145-46.
165 OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
166 St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 660; see also supra note 78 and ac-
companying text.
167 See St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 642-43 (argument of bank
counsel); id. at 645-48 (argument of the Solicitor General). See
also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1991) (holding
that a legal argument was ‘‘implicitly reject[ed]’’ in a previous
Supreme Court decision because that argument, if accepted,
would have made it ‘‘quite unnecessary’’ for the Court to ‘‘es-
tablish’’ the ‘‘rule’’ contained in its earlier decision).
168 OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 396 n.8.
169 Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X In-
ternet Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2701 (2005) (emphasis in origi-
nal) (quoting Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel,
Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990)). See also id. (explaining that ‘‘a
court’s prior interpretation of a statute [will] override an agen-
cy’s interpretation only if the relevant court decision held the
statute unambiguous’’).
170 OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 396 n.9.
171 See First Union v. Burke, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49, 151;
supra notes 79-83, 162-64 and accompanying text (discussing
Burke).
172 OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 405 n.12 (citing Bank
One Delaware NA v. Wilens, 2003 WL 21703629 (C.D. Cal. July
7, 2003), and Goleta National Bank v. O’Donnnell, 239
F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D. Ohio 2002)).
173 See Bank One v. Wilens, 2003 WL 21703629 at *1-*2)
(concluding, without any detailed analysis, that plaintiff could
not bring a ‘‘private attorney general’’ suit against a national
bank, in view of 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 and the OCC’s interpreta-
tion of the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of § 484(a));
Goleta v. O’Donnell, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 757 (declaring, with-
out any analysis, that § 484(a) and 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 prohibit
state officials from bringing either administrative or judicial
enforcement actions against national banks).
174 Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 412, 96 Stat. 1521 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 484(b)).
175 See S. Rep. No. 97-536, at 29, 62 (1982) (explaining the
scope and purpose of § 484(b)), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3054, 3082, 3115.
176 Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 412, 96 Stat. 1521 (codified as 12
U.S.C. § 484(a)).
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change.’’177 By 1982, as shown above, the Supreme
Court and other federal and state courts had consis-
tently upheld the authority of state officials to bring ju-
dicial proceedings to enforce state laws against national
banks—a result that was consistent with the unqualified
terms of the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause.
In contrast, the OCC’s regulations in 1982 did not in-
clude any interpretation of that clause. In fact, the OCC
‘‘acquiesced’’ in 1999 to the interpretation of the
‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause in First Union v.
Burke, an interpretation that was faithful to Bay City
and other judicial decisions.178 The OCC did not put
forward its current interpretation barring judicial en-
forcement by state officials until 2003, when it pub-
lished notice of its proposal to adopt 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000(b)(2).179 Given those circumstances, Congress’
reenactment of the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’
clause in 1982 must be viewed as an implicit congres-
sional endorsement of prior court decisions upholding
the right of state officials to obtain judicial enforcement
of state laws against national banks.
4. The OCC’s Limited Rulemaking Power
Under 12 U.S.C. § 93a Did Not Give the
OCC Authority to Adopt 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000(b)(2)
In OCC v. Spitzer, the District Court further erred by
holding that 12 U.S.C. § 93a provided the OCC with
supplemental authority to adopt 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000(b)(2).180 Under 12 U.S.C. § 93a, the OCC may
issue regulations ‘‘to carry out the responsibilities of the
office.’’ When § 93a was enacted in 1980, Congress
made clear that the OCC does not have authority there-
under to expand the statutory powers of national banks:
‘‘[Section 93a] is only available to carry out the re-
sponsibilities of the [OCC] and carries with it no new au-
thority to confer on national banks powers which they do
not have under existing substantive law. To give national
banks authority under this rulemaking provision that
they do not possess under existing substantive law
would not be carrying out the responsibilities of the
[OCC] since only Congress can define those responsibili-
ties so as to confer powers on national banks.’’181
In Conference of State Bank Supervisors v.
Conover,182 the D.C. Circuit explained that (i) § 93a
‘‘grants no new substantive powers to [national]
banks’’; and (ii) § 93a allows the OCC to preempt state
laws only ‘‘[s]o long as [the OCC] does not authorize
activities that run afoul of federal laws governing the
activities of national banks.’’183 Subsequently, the same
court confirmed that ‘‘[n]ational banks, being creatures
of statute, possess only those powers conferred upon them
by Congress.’’184 The court therefore struck down an
OCC ruling that expanded the powers of national banks
beyond the limits established by Congress.185
In view of the limited rulemaking power granted by
§ 93a, the OCC had no authority to issue a regulation
barring the states from exercising their sovereign au-
thority to bring judicial enforcement proceedings
against national banks. The OCC’s ‘‘interpretation’’
contained in 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2) is contradicted by
the unqualified terms of the ‘‘vested in the courts of jus-
tice’’ of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a), as well as its history and ju-
dicial application. As the D.C. Circuit has observed, ‘‘a
dramatic rewriting of the statute is not mere interpreta-
tion.’’186
In Gonzalez v. Oregon, the Supreme Court held that
21 U.S.C. § 871(b) did not give the Attorney General a
‘‘broad authority to promulgate rules’’ because the stat-
ute only authorized him to issue regulations ‘‘which he
may deem necessary and appropriate for the efficient
execution of his functions under this [Act}.’’187 The At-
torney General’s power to issue rules to execute his
‘‘functions’’ under § 871(b) is essentially the same as
the OCC’s authority to issue regulations to ‘‘carry out
[its] responsibilities’’ under 12 U.S.C. § 93a.
The Supreme Court drew a sharp distinction in
Gonzalez between the limited terms of § 871(b) and the
much broader language of statutes that authorize agen-
cies to adopt rules ‘‘in the public interest to carry out
the provisions’’ of a statute or ‘‘to effectuate the pur-
poses of’’ the statute.188 In view of § 871(b)’s limited
scope, the Court concluded that the Attorney General
could not ‘‘define the substantive standards of medical
practice’’ in a manner that went ‘‘well beyond the
177 Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985) (quoting
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)).
178 OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 399-400, 404-05 (dis-
cussing regulations adopted by the OCC under § 484 between
1971 and 2004, and pointing out that ‘‘[t]he OCC acknowl-
edges that its current interpretation of the courts of justice ex-
ception is inconsistent with the position it acquiesced to in First
Union Nat’l Bank v. Burke’’) (emphasis added). See also supra
notes 79-83, 162-64 and accompanying text (discussing
Burke).
179 Id. at 400 (describing the OCC’s proposal to adopt 12
C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2) in 2003, and its adoption of that rule in
2004).
180 Id. at 398.
181 126 Cong. Rec. 6902 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire,
Senate floor manager for the 1980 legislation) (emphasis
added). See also H.R. Rep. No. 96-842, at 83 (1980) (Conf.
Rep.), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 298, 313 (stating that
§ 93a ‘‘carries with it no authority to permit otherwise imper-
missible activities of national banks with specific reference to
the provisions of the McFadden Act and the Glass-Steagall
Act’’).
182 710 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
183 Id. at 885 (emphasis in original).
184 Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638,
640 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Texas
& Pac. Ry. Co v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 253 (1934)).
185 Id. at 643-45.
186 ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d at 470.
187 Gonzalez v. Oregon, No. 04-623 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006), slip
op. at 12 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 871(b)).
188 Id., slip op. at 11-12 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) and 15
U.S.C. § 1604(a)).
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[CSA’s] specific grants of authority.’’189 For the same
reason, 12 U.S.C. § 93a did not authorize the OCC to
adopt 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2), because that regulation
changes the substantive meaning and scope of the
‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause in a way that
conflicts with the ‘‘plain language of the [statutory]
text.’’190
Similarly, in Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin.
Corp.,191 the Supreme Court struck down a regulation
of the Federal Reserve Board that attempted to redefine
the statutory definition of ‘‘bank’’ in § 2(c) of the Bank
Holding Company Act (‘‘BHC Act’’).192 As it did in
Gonzalez, the Supreme Court declared that a federal
agency cannot expand the limits of its authority by dis-
regarding the ‘‘plain language’’ of the governing stat-
ute.193
The Court also rejected the Board’s attempt to rely on
its rulemaking power under § 5(b) of the BHC Act.194
The Court held that ‘‘§ 5 only permits the Board to po-
lice within the boundaries of the [BHC] Act; it does not
permit the Board to expand its jurisdiction beyond the
boundaries established by Congress.’’195 For the same
reason, 12 U.S.C. § 93a does not authorize the OCC to
redraw the boundary line that Congress has clearly es-
tablished in 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) between (i) the OCC ‘s
exclusive authority to bring administrative enforcement
proceedings against national banks, and (ii) the author-
ity of federal and state courts to entertain suits against
national banks by federal and state officials and private
parties pursuant to the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’
clause.
Conclusion
OCC v. Spitzer represents a fundamental misapplica-
tion of the Chevron doctrine and should be reversed.
The District Court improperly upheld an OCC regula-
tion that (i) disregards the plain meaning of the ‘‘vested
in the courts of justice’’ clause of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a),
and (ii) purports to overturn more than a century of ju-
dicial decisions affirming the right of state officials to
file court suits to enforce state laws against national
banks.
Unless OCC v. Spitzer is reversed, the OCC is likely
to continue its trend of preempting state laws in any
area where Congress has not explicitly forbidden the
OCC to act. The OCC’s preemption campaign may serve
the interests of large, multistate banks whose allegiance
the OCC wants to preserve or attract. However, the
OCC’s preemption efforts—unless stopped by the
courts or Congress—will continue to undermine the
dual banking system, impair state sovereignty, and
greatly weaken the protections provided by state laws
to consumers of financial services.196
In view of the recent decisions by the Supreme Court
in Gonzalez v. Oregon and by the D.C. Circuit in ABA v.
FTC, the District Court clearly failed to apply a crucial
precondition for Chevron deference. That
precondition—which I call ‘‘Chevron step 2.1’’—
requires a reviewing court to determine whether Con-
gress intended to delegate the full extent of rulemaking
authority claimed by the federal agency, particularly
where the agency seeks to expand its jurisdiction or to
infringe upon a sovereign state power.
Unless courts apply ‘‘Chevron step 2.1’’ in future de-
cisions involving OCC regulations, the OCC will enjoy a
‘‘virtually limitless hegemony’’ as long as Congress fails
to enact statutes that ‘‘expressly negate’’ the OCC’s abil-
ity to act.197 Such an outcome would be contrary to the
teachings of Gonzalez v. Oregon and ABA v. FTC.
Moreover, it would vitiate what I have always believed
to be the most important principle of administrative
law—namely, that ‘‘[t]he rulemaking power granted to
an administrative agency is not the power to make law.
Rather, it is the power to adopt regulations to carry into
effect the will of Congress as expressed in the
[governing] statute.’’198
189 Id., slip op. at 17-18.
190 Id., slip op. at 18.
191 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
192 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c).
193 Dimension, 474 U.S. at 373-74; see also id. at 368 (hold-
ing that ‘‘[t]he traditional deference courts pay to agency inter-
pretation is not to be applied to alter the clearly expressed in-
tent of Congress’’).
194 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b).
195 Dimension, 474 U.S. at 373 n.6.
196 See generally Wilmarth, supra note 34.
197 ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d at 468 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 29 F.3d at 671).
198 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977)
(emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976)).
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